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STUDENT NOTES
The Use of Prior Convictions to Impeach the
Credibility of the Criminal Defendant
INTRODUCTION
Under the early common law, conviction of an "infamous crime"
disqualified one as a witness.' This rule was abolished by the
legislatures of the various states, but in so doing, the legislatures
generally provided that prior criminal convictions could be used to
impeach the credibility of witnesses.' In many instances, these
ISee C. McCoRMICK, EVIDENCE, § 43, at 89 (1954). Infamous crimes
included treason, felonies and acts which involved falsehood.
2 Id. 3 J. WImoRn, EViDENCE, § 980, at 538 (3d. ed. 1940).
[160]
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statutory provisions lead to practices which are as prejudicial to
the accused when he testifies in his own behalf as the common law
disqualification was unreasonable.
The courts recognize that evidence of prior criminal convictions
is inadmissible for the purpose of establishing a defendant's guilt or
to show that it is probable that the defendant committed the crime
for which he has been indicted.3 However, there are well established
exceptions to this general rule. Such evidence is admissible when
particularly probative in showing such facts as intent, an element
in the crime, identity, malice, motive, a system of criminal activity,
or when the defendant has raised the issue of his character or has
testified and the prosecution attempts to impeach his credibility.4
Although the possibility of prejudice resulting from the admission
of such evidence is recognized, its admission is considered to be
justified because of the validity of the state's purpose in presenting
the evidence and the prospect that, on balance, the probative value
of such evidence will outweigh any prejudicial effect it might have.'
In addition, "the defendant's interests are protected by limiting
instructions, . . . , and by the discretion residing with the trial
judge to limit or forbid the admission of particularly prejudicial
evidence even though admissible under an accepted rule of law."6
There is a wide diversity among the jurisdictions concerning the
nature of the crimes that may be shown to impeach the credibility
of a witness.7 Some jurisdictions permit only the use of infamous
crimes for the purpose of impeachment.' Others allow the prosecution
to show felonies or misdemeanors, 9 while still others limit the crimes
provable to felonies."0 There are jurisdictions which permit only the
use of crimes involving moral turpitude for impeachment, and this
is true whether the crimes are classified as misdemeanors or
felonies.'" Finally, in some jurisdictions the trial court is vested with
3 Lane v. Warden, Maryland Penitentiary, 320 F.2d 179, 181 (4th Cir.
1963); People v. Kelley, 57 Cal. Rptr. 363, 369, 424 P.2d 947, 953 (1967);
State v. Cote, 108 N.H. 290, 294, 235 A.2d 111, 114 (1967); Whitty v. State,
34 Wis. 2d 278, 291, 149 N.W.2d 557, 563 (1967).
4Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 560 (1967); People v. Molineaux,
168 N.Y. 264, 61 N.E. 286 (1901); State v. Lewis, 133 W. Va. 584, 596-97,
57 S.E.2d 513, 522 (1949).
5 Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 560 (1967).
6 Id. at 561.
7 C. McCoRMIcK, supra note 1, at § § 89-90 (collecting authorities).
8 E.g., People v. Thomas, 393 I11. 573, 67 N.E.2d 192 (1946).9E.g., State v. Friedman, 124 W. Va. 4, 18 S.E.2d 653 (1942).
'
0 E.g., State v. Sorrell, 85 Ariz. 173, 333 P.2d 1081 (1959).
11 E.g., Nutter v. Dearing, 400 S.W.2d 346 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966).
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the discretion to determine whether any particular criminal con-
viction affects the credibility of a witness. 2
The rationale for admitting a prior criminal conviction for
impeachment purposes is that the jury should have some information
concerning the defendant's character to aid it in evaluating and
determining the weight to be accorded to his testimony.13 One
court has stated the proposition in this manner: "When a defendant
voluntarily testifies in a criminal case, he asks the jury to accept his
word. No sufficient reason appears why the jury should not be
informed what sort of person is asking them to take his word."' 4
It seems, however, that the natural distrust which members of a
jury undoubtedly have for one who is charged with a criminal
offense would assure that they would act with restraint in determining
the weight to be given a defendant's testimony, whether or not they
are made aware of his past wrongdoing."
OBJECTIONS
The major objection to the present procedure of admitting prior
convictions to impeach a witness results from the diverse nature
of the crimes that may be used for impeachment purposes.6 Many
of these crimes have no special relevancy to the question of the
veracity of a witness.'" Thus, in view of the admitted prejudice
aroused by the admission of prior convictions to impeach an accused
12 Taylor v. State, 226 Md. 561, 174 A.2d 573 (1961).3 State v. Cote, 108 N.H. 290, 235 A.2d 111 (1967); State v. Duke,
100 N.H. 292, 123 A.2d 745 (1956).
14State v. Duke, 100 N.H. 292, 293-94, 123 A.2d 745, 746 (1956).
See Ladd, Credibility Tests--Current Trends, 89 U. PA. L. REv. 166, 176-76
(1940); Note, Other Crimes Evidence at Trial: 01 Balancing and Other
Matters, 70 YALE L.J. 763, 776 (1961).
Is In Brown v. United States, 370 F.2d 242, 244 (D.C. Cir. 1966),
the court stated that
one need not look for prior convictions to find a motive to falsify, for
certainly that motive inheres in any case, whether or not a defendant
has a prior record. What greater incentive is there than the avoidance
of conviction? We can expect jurors to be naturally wary of a defendant's
testimony, even though they may be unaware of his past conduct.
16 Ladd, Credibility Tests-Current Trends, 89 U. PA. L. Rnv. 166, 178
(1940).
17 E.g., State v. Webb, 99 W. Va. 225, 128 S.E. 97 (1925). In the Webb
case the court recognized that crimes of violence have very little probative
value regarding the credibility of a witness. The court stated that
many persons have been convicted of crimes and misdemeanors engender-
ed by the heat of passion and inconsiderate action, infirmities in human
nature that are more or less prevalent in all. We can see no reason
why such convictions would affect the credibility or veracity of such
a person who is being tried for a subsequent and wholly unconnected
offense. Id. at 230, 218 S.E. at 99; See C. McCoRMICK, EVIDENCE, supra
note 1, at 157.
[Vol. 71
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who testifies in his own behalf, it would seem patently unfair to
permit proof of convictions of crimes which serve only to prejudice
the accused in the minds of the jurors while failing entirely to
accomplish the purpose for which they are admitted.
One of the precautions which the trial court takes to eliminate
or minimize any prejudice that may result from the introduction.
into evidence of prior criminal convictions of an accused is the
use of limiting instructions which caution the jury to consider the
evidence not as proof of the accused's guilt of the crime presently
charged, but only as such evidence affects the credibility of the
accused as a witness.' 8 There are grave doubts about the effectiveness
of such a protective measure.' 9 Studies indicate that such an in-
struction operates to sensitize the jury to credibility evidence and
that the jury either cannot or will not restrict its use to the question
of a defendant's credibility.2" Many jurists recognize that it is un-
realistic to suppose that an individual can "compartmentalize" his
mind and consider such evidence only in regard to the question of
credibility and not allow it to affect his determination of the guilt
or innocence of the defendant.2 ' Such a limiting instruction has been
characterized as "the recommendation to the jury of a mental
18 People v. Smith, 48 Cal. Rptr. 382, 409 P.2d 222 (1966). In the
Smith case the accused testified in his own behalf and on cross-examination
was questioned about prior convictions. The Supreme Court of California
found no merit to the defendant's contention that the limiting instruction
given by the court did not protect him adequately from prejudice and held
that the following limiting instruction was adequate to protect the defendant's
substantive rights: "You must not use this evidence in determining the
defendant's guilt or innocence of the other charges, nor must you permit
yourself to be influenced against the defendant because he may have suffer-
ed a prior felony conviction." Id. at 390, 409 P.2d at 230. See Note, The
Limiting Instruction-Its Effectiveness and Effect, 51 MiN. L. Rv. 264
(1966).
,9 See Note, The Limiting Instruction-Its Effectiveness and Effect, 51
MIN. L. REV. 264 (1966).20 See Broeder, The University of Chicago Jury Project, 38 NEB. L. Rev.
744. Results of studies of juries indicated that when the jury became aware
that a defendant was insured, the verdicts rendered were greater than those
when the jury was not aware that a defendant was insured. Significantly,
verdicts returned were the highest when the jury became aware of the fact
that a defendant was insured, and the court instructed the jury to disregard
such knowledge in determining the amount of the judgment. It is reasonable
to believe that the same kind of reaction would occur in the analogous
situation of an instruction to disregard evidence of a prior offense except
as it might bear on the credibility of the accused. See Note, Other Crimes
Evidence, 70 YALE L.J. 763, 777 (1961).
21 E.g., Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 453 (1949) (Jackson,
J., concurring); Stevens v. United States, 370 F.2d 485 (D.C. Cir. 1966)
(Fahy, J., dissenting); Awkard v. United States, 352 F.2d 641 (D.C. Cir.
1965) (Washington, J.); Harrison v. State, 217 Tenn. 31, 394 S.W.2d 713
(1965).
1969]
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gymnastic which is beyond, not only their powers, but anybody's
else.M
22
As a result of the inadequacy of measures available to a trial
judge for protecting the defendant from prejudice, the defendant
finds himself in a dilemma.23 He faces the almost certain prospect
of prejudice whether he testifies in his own behalf or refrains from
doing so. If the defendant elects to testify in his own behalf, he
opens the door to proof of his prior criminal convictions and the
resulting prejudice which arises in the minds of the jurors. This
prejudice arises because of the inclination of the jury to conclude
that past convictions of crime tend to establish a defendant's guilt
of the crime presently charged and from the jury's tendency to
punish a defendant presently for crimes committed in the past.2
Thus, although a defendant's testimony may provide useful informa-
tion, the threat of the exposure of his criminal record may keep
him from testifying. 5 If the defendant, fearing the consequences of
the impeachment of his credibility, does not testify in his own
behalf, the jury will undoubtedly infer that he is attempting to
conceal information that would be unfavorable to him.2 Studies
have tended to show that this threat of prejudice does in fact
influence defendants not to take the stand. It has likewise been
indicated that the defendant's fear that prejudice may result from
the disclosure of his prior criminal convictions is not unfounded. In
a survey reported in The American Jury,8 an attempt was made
22 Nash v. United States, 54 F.2d 1006, 1007 (2d Cir. 1932) (Hand, J.).
23 Brown v. United States, 370 F.2d 242, 243 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
24 See Note, Other Crimes Evidence at Trial: Of Balancing and Other
Matters, 70 YALE L.J. 763 (1961).25 Brown v. United States, 370 F.2d 242, 243 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
26 For a more detailed discussion of this problem see Note, Impeaching
the Accused by His Prior Crimes-A New Approach to an Old Problem, 19
HAsTINGS L.J. 919 (1968).2 7 H. KALvEN and H. ZEIsEL, THE AMERCAN JuRY (1966). As part of
a jury study done under the auspices of the University of Chicago and
reported in The American Jury, defendants were divided into two classes-
those with no criminal record and those with a criminal record. The object
of the study was to determine what effect, if any, the existence of a prior
criminal record would have on a defendant's decision to testify in his own
behalf. The study revealed that in cases in which the evidence was consider-
ed to be clear for an acquittal, defendants with a criminal record testified
in only 53 percent of the cases while defendants with no criminal record
elected to testify 90 percent of the time. The explanation of these results
appears to be that counsel for a defendant with a prior criminal record does
not wish to jeopardize the favorable position in which he and his client find
themselves, and thus he refuses to allow his client to testify and undergo
damaging cross-examination during which the client might be forced to
testify concerning his prior criminal convictions.28 1d.
[Vol. 71
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to determine what effect, if any, the jury's awareness of a defendant's
prior record might have on his chances of an acquittal. The results
of the studies seemed to demonstrate that a defendant with a prior
criminal record of which the jury was aware had a substantially
smaller chance of acquittal than did a defendant without a prior
criminal record. 9
Considering the results of the foregoing surveys, it would seem,
and it has been suggested,3" that the practice of using prior criminal
convictions to impeach a defendant is subject to attack on at least
two constitutional grounds. If a defendant with a prior criminal
record is less likely than a first offender to take the stand, and, if
he does, to be acquitted, it can plausibly be argued that he is thereby
being denied equal protection of the laws. While a defendant with
a prior criminal record is subject to this prejudice, a defendant
without such a record may testify freely without fear of being ad-
versely affected in any manner by such prior convictions. In both
cases the defendants are before the court for the same purpose-to
have their guilt or innocence of the present crime determined; but
they are not accorded equal protection against the adverse effect
of cross examination. Another constitutional question arises when
a defendant testifies in his own behalf and is compelled to answer
questions about prior criminal convictions. The fifth amendment
provides that a defendant in a criminal case shall not be compelled
to be a witness against himself. If in fact the jury's knowledge of a
29 Id. at 160-61. For the purposes of the survey defendants were classi-
fied in two categories. One group of defendants included those who had
no criminal record or were able to conceal it from the jury. Another group
of defendants included those who either had a criminal record of which
the jury was aware, or who were suspected by the jury of having a criminal
record. Under these circumstances when the strength of the prosecution's
case was "normal" the first class of defendants, those who had no criminal
record or who were able to conceal it from the jury, received acquittals in
65 percent of the cases surveyed; while defendants in the second class, those
who either had a criminal record of which the jury was aware or who were
suspected of having a criminal record, received acquittals in only 38 percent
of the cases surveyed. Since the juries gave an acquittal in the same cir-
cumstances to almost twice as many defendants who to their knowledge
were first offenders, it seems that the jury's knowledge of a defendant's
prior criminal record is so prejudicial that it may deprive the defendant of
a fair trial.
30 See, e.g., Stevens v. United States, 370 F.2d 485, 486 (1966) (Fahy,
J., dissenting). "A serious question of fundamental unfairness arises when
an evidentiary rule may deter a defendant from testifying in his own behalf
or, if he does testify, subjects him to evidence highly prejudicial on the
issue of guilt although inadmissible for that purpose." See, Note, Constitutional
Problems Inherent in the Admissibility of Prior Record Conviction Evidencefor the Purpose of Impeaching the Credibility of the Defendant Witness,
37 U. CN. L. R1v. 168 (1968) [hereinafter referred to as Constitutional
Problems].
1969]
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defendant's prior criminal convictions does diminish his chances
for an acquittal, it appears that when a defendant, with a prior
criminal record, is compelled to answer on cross examination whether
he has been previously convicted of crime, his privilege against
self-incrimination has been abridged."
SOLUTIONS
As was observed earlier, the most objectionable feature of the
rule that allows the use of prior convictions to impeach a witness
is the wide range of crimes that may be shown for the purpose of
impeachment. 2 A provision in the Model Code of Evidence33 is
31 Constitutional Problems, supra note 30. An analogous situation in
which the practice of permitting the jury to be apprised of a defendant's prior
criminal convictions has been questioned is the common law method of
determining the guilt of an alleged multiple offender under an habitual
criminal statute. Under the common law method, the prosecution presents
evidence in its case-in-chief on both the issue of the defendant's guilt of the
crime presently charged and on the issue of his status as a habitual criminal.
Thus the jury is informed, before making a determination of the defendant's
guilt or innocence of the present crime, of the defendant's past criminal
record. Although the constitutionality of the common law method was
sustained in Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 575 (1967), Chief Justice War-
ren writing for the minority recognized that the danger of introducing
evidence of other crimes is that the "jury might punish the accused for
being guilty of a previous offense, or feel that incarceration is justified
because the accused is a bad man without regard to his guilt of the crime
currently charged." The minority also refused to be swayed by the argument
that limiting instructions offered by the trial court afford the defendant
adequate protection from prejudice. Because the conviction of crimes in the
past is totally irrelevant to the question of a defendant's guilt or innocence
of a crime currently charged, the minority opinion suggests that a habitual
criminal prosecution is not an instance in which the court is called on to
balance the probative value of prior convictions against the probable pre-
judicial effect they will have on a defendant if introduced into evidence.
Likewise it is submitted that although some crimes may be relevant in im-
peaching credibility, most are so irrelevent to the question of guilt, they
should not be admitted for impeachment purposes. Many courts and
legislatures recognizing the prejudice inherent in the common law procedure
have made efforts to devise methods which will protect the accused from
prejudice. Thus, many courts have by judicial decision adopted the so-
called Connecticut method under which the jury is not informed of the
defendant's prior criminal convictions until they have returned a verdict on
the offense presently charged. State v. Ferrone, 96 Conn. 160, 113 A. 452
(1921); State v. Johnson, 86 Idaho 51, 383 P.2d 326 (1963); Harrison v.
State, 217 Tenn. 31, 394 S.W.2d 713 (1965). The legislatures of several
states have adopted statutes which provide a procedure in habitual criminal
prosecutions similar to the Connecticut method. A complete list of statutes
and decisions can be found in Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 586 (1967).
The West Virginia legislature has evidenced its disapproval of the common
law method by the enactment of a statute which provides for separate
hearings on the issue of a defendant's guilt of the crime presently charged
and his status as an habitual criminal. W. VA. CODE ch. 61, art. 11, §
19 (Michie 1966).
32 Note 16 and accompanying text, supra.
33 MODEL CODE OF EViDENcE rule 106 (1942).
(Vol. 71
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designed to eliminate this objection. It specifies that for the purposes
of impeaching the credibility of any witness, only crimes involving
dishonesty or false statement are admissible. 4 This rule recognizes
that many crimes which are now admitted for the purpose of affect-
ing the credibility of a defendant have, in fact, no tendency to show
lack of veracity on behalf of the witness. Other commentators have
taken this same position and suggest that "there is no justification for
the use of crimes in the omnibus."35 Further, since it is the nature
of a crime, rather than the length of a sentence imposed for the
commission thereof, which indicates lack of veracity, both felonies
and misdemeanors involving dishonesty or false statement should be
admissible for purposes of impeachment. 6
The Model Code also attempts to protect the defendant from any
prejudice which might result from the introduction of prior criminal
convictions to impeach his credibility. Rule 106(3) puts the defend-
ant in control of the impeachment process by providing that when
the accused testifies in his own behalf no evidence concerning his
commission or conviction of crime may be introduced for the
purpose of impeaching his credibility unless the accused first intro-
duces evidence for the purpose of supporting his credibility. 7 Under
a rule such as this, a defendant should not be deterred from testify-
ing because he fears impeachment by the use of prior criminal
convictions.
The court of appeals for the District of Columbia has by judicial
decision established a new technique for determining the admissibility
of prior crimes evidence for the purpose of impeaching a witness.
In Luck v. United States,38 the court, operating under a statute that
3 4
1d.
35 Ladd, supra note 14.3 6
1d.37 MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 106(3) (1942). Rule 201(3) of the
Model Code provides that "[i]f an accused in a criminal action does not
testify, judge and counsel may comment on accused's failure to testify,
and the trier of fact may draw all reasonable inferences therefrom." The
purpose of the drafters of the Model Code was to encourage the accused
to testify in his own behalf without being unduly prejudiced by the introduc-
tion of a cross examination concerning prior criminal convictions. However,
Rule 201(3) appears to do more than merely encourage the accused to
testify in his own behalf; it is coercive in nature. It would seem that such
a provision is unnecessary. The accused's failure to testify in his own behalf
will seldom go unnoticed by the jury, and is most cases this failure will cause
the jury to make an adverse inference regarding the defendant's guilt. The
drafters of the Uniform Rules of Evidence adopted the provisions of the
Model Code. UNimoRm RLEs OF EVIDENCE rules 21, 23(4). See McCormick,
High Lights of the Uniform Evidence Rules, 33 TEXAs L. Ruv. 559, 568-69(1955).38 348 F.2d 763 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
1969]
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provided that conviction of a crime would not render one incompetent
to testify but that "such fact may be given in evidence to affect his
credibility as a witness . . . ,"I held that the statute did not give
the prosecution an absolute right to introduce evidence of prior
convictions of an accused for the purpose of impeaching his credi-
bility. ' Rather, the court held that in all cases the admissibility of
prior convictions for impeachment purposes is a discretionary deci-
sion to be made by the court.41 The court stated the proposition in
this manner:
The trial court is not required to allow impeachment by
prior conviction everytime a defendant takes the stand in his
own defense. The statute, in our view, leaves room for the
exercise of a sound judicial discretion to play upon the cir-
cumstances as they unfold in a particular case. There may well
be cases where the trial judge might think that the cause of
truth would be helped more by letting the jury have the de-
fendant's story than by defendant's foregoing that opportunity
because of the fear of prejudice founded upon a prior convic-
tion. There may well be other cases where the trial judge
believes the prejudicial effect of impeachment far outweighs
the probative relevance of the prior conviction to the issue of
credibility. That is, of course, a standard which trial judges
apply every day in other contexts, and we think it has both
utility and applicability in this field.4
What the court suggests is a balancing procedure whereby prejudi-
cial effect of impeachment will be weighed against the probative
relevance of the prior conviction to the issue of credibility.4 3 If the
39 In relevant part, D.C. CODE 14-305 (1967) provides:
A person is not incompetent to testify, in either civil or criminal
proceedings, by reason of his having been convicted of crime. The
fact of conviction may be given in evidence to affect his credibility as
a witness, either upon the cross-examination of the witness or by
evidence aliunde; and the party cross-examining him is not bound by
his answers to such matters.40 Luck v. United States, 348 F.2d 763, 767 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
41 Id.
42 Id. at 768.43 See Gordon v. United States, 383 F.2d 936, 939 (D.C. Cir. 1967), in
which the court states that
the defendant who has a criminal record may ask the court to weigh
the probative value of the convictions as to the credibility against the
degree of prejudice which the revelation of the past crimes will cause;
and he may ask the court to consider whether it is more important for
the jury to hear his story than to know about prior convictions in relation
to his credibility. (Emphasis added).
[Vol. 71
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court finds that the former "far outweighs" the latter, such evidence
will not be admissible.44 In making this decision the court should
consider "the nature of the prior crimes, the length of the criminal
record, the age and circumstances of the defendant, and, above all,
the extent to which it is more important to the search for truth in
a particular case for the jury to hear the defendant's story than to
know of a prior conviction."45 In addition, one court has suggested
that crimes which involve dishonest conduct may have probative
value on the issue of credibility, but crimes of violence generally do
not.46 The remoteness of a prior conviction also has a bearing on its
relevance in regard to the credibility of a witness.47 Prior convictions
for the same crime for which a defendant is currently being tried
have an extremely prejudicial effect on a defendant's chances for a
fair and impartial trial and should be admitted sparingly. When a
defendant has been convicted several times of the same crime for
which he is currently charged, impeachment should be limited to
the admission of only one conviction when the circumstances indicate
strong reasons for disclosure and the conviction directly relates to
veracity.48 Finally, the court must consider the effect of a defendant's
failure to testify due to his fear that his credibility will be impeached
by the introduction of evidence of prior convictions.49
The burden of showing that the prejudicial effect of prior crimes
evidence outweights its probative value lies with the defendant. In the
absence of such a showing, evidence of prior convictions will or-
dinarily be admissible."0 Because the Luck procedure for determining
44 "This is a classic illustration of a case in which the prejudicial effect
of impeachment far outweighs the probative relevance of the prior conviction
to the issue of credibility." Brown v. United States, 370 F.2d 242, 244
(D.C. Cir. 1966).45 Luck v. United States, 348 F.2d 763, 769 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
46 Gordon v. United States, 383 F.2d 936, 940 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
47 Id.
48 Id. See Payne v. United States, 392 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
49 Gordon v. United States, 383 F.2d 936, 940 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
-
5 Id. at 939. There is dicta in a case decided by the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia before the decision in Gordon which suggests
that the trial court has an obligation to apply the Luck procedure when a
defendant is cross examined concerning prior criminal convictions even
though the defendant's counsel does not invoke the Luck doctrine. Lewis v.
United States, 381 F.2d 894 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (dictum). The court implied
that the failure of both counsel for the defendant and the trial court to invoke
the Luck procedure in appropriate circumstances would not preclude the
court of appeals from considering such a failure as a ground for reversal.
However, it now appears to be settled "that unless defense counsel seeks
to invoke the trial court's discretion in rejecting evidence of prior convictions,
there can be no abuse of discretion in admitting such evidence." Blakney
v. United States, 225 A.2d 654, 655 (D.C. Ct. App. 1967).
1969]
10
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 71, Iss. 2 [1969], Art. 5
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol71/iss2/5
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
the admissibility of evidence of prior conviction is designed to make
the question of admissibility turn on the one consideration of major
importance-whether the probative value of a prior conviction will
outweigh its prejudicial effect-it seems preferable to other tech-
niques of determining admissibility.
However, the Luck approach has not been widely adopted, nor
has it gone uncriticized. Judge Donaher of the District of Columbia
Circuit Court dissented from the majority opinion in the Luck case,"
stating that he felt the court had misconstrued the language of the
statute in question and that the statute in question "tells the trier the
fact of conviction is evidence, and it is to be received." 2 The prosecu-
tion has the option of introducing the evidence if it desires." This
11 Luck v. United States, 348 F.2d 763, 771 (D.C. Cir. 1965). (Donaher,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.)52 Id.
53 This would appear to be in accord with the construction given to
W. VA. CODE ch. 57, art. 3, § 6, by the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals. In the syllabus of the case of State v. Friedman, 124 W. Va. 4,
18 S.E.2d 653 (1942) the following statement is found: "Code 57-3-6, requires
an accused who voluntarily becomes a witness in his own behalf to state in
response to questions propounded on cross-examination, whether or not he
has been convicted of other offenses." (Emphasis added). It is interesting
to note that the mandatory language of the syllabus does not appear in the
opinion of the court. However, this rule has been adopted in many later cases.
See States v. Riss & Co., 139 W. Va. 1, 80 S.E.2d 9 (1953); State v.
Blankenship, 137 W. Va. 1, 69 S.E.2d 398 (1952); State v. La Rosa, 129
W. Va. 634, 41 S.E.2d 121 (1946). The court has admonished prosecutors, as
well as the trial courts, to limit questions to the accused on cross-examinations
concerning prior criminal convictions to matters which are relevant to the
matter in issue. In addition, it appears that when the prosecution fails to
limit its questions to relevant matters, the trial court, on request should
require it to do so. State v. La Rosa, 129 W. Va. 634, 41 S.E.2d 121 (1946);
State v. McMillion, 127 W. Va. 197, 32 S.E.2d 625 (1944). Although the
rule laid down by the court in the Friedman case has been followed by later
cases, the cases of States v. Riss & Co., 139 W. Va. 1, 80 S.E.2d 9 (1953),
contains language which seems to misinterpret or disregard completely the
decision in Friedman. In States v. Riss & Co. the court considered the
question of whether a witness in a civil case should be subject to cross-
examination as to prior criminal convictions for the purpose of impeaching
his credibility. The court in answering the question in the affirmative
recognized that it was a question of first impression in West Virginia. The
court referred to its decision in the Friedman case and then made the follow-
ing statement:
This Court sees no reason why the rule applicable to criminal cases
should not apply to civil proceedings. However, we do not propose to
enlarge the rule as to civil cases beyond that now prevailing in criminal
proceedings. We hold that the admissibility of such evidence to attack
the credibility of a witness in civil cases rests in the sound discretion
of the trial court. States v. Riss & Co., 139 W. Va. 1, 16, 80 S.E.2d
9, 17 (1953).
This statement does indicate some confusion on the part of the court con-
cerning the right to cross-examine the accused as to prior criminal convictions
when he testifies in his own behalf.
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